Are crisis-induced devaluations contractionary? by Ramkishen S. Rajan & Chung-Hua Shen













Ramkishen S. Rajan 
School of Economics 
University of Adelaide, Australia 
and 







National Cheng-Chi University, Taiwan 
and 
Visiting Scholar 
Center for Pacific Basin Monetary and Economic Studies 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
 






Center for Pacific Basin Monetary and Economic Studies  
Economic Research Department 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco  











Ramkishen S. Rajan 
School of Economics 
University of Adelaide, Australia  
and  






National Chengchi University, Taiwan 
and 
Visiting Scholar 
Center for Pacific Basin Monetary and Economic Studies 









Center for Pacific Basin Monetary and Economic Studies 
Economic Research Department 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
101 Market Street 
San Francisco, CA  94105-1579 
Tel: (415) 974-3184 















Why are some currency crises followed by economic contractions while others are not? This paper is 
an attempt at answering this query. In particular, we investigate two closely related questions. First, we 
explore whether there is a difference in the output effects of a devaluation during “normal” periods versus 
crises ones; after all, during noncrisis periods, real exchange devaluation is seen as an important policy option 
for promoting exports and output growth. Yet, the literature has not made a distinction between crisis and 
noncrisis periods. To preview the main conclusion, we find that the contractionary effects tend to exist only 
during the crisis period. Building on this, we go one to explore the factors that cause a crisis-induced 
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1.  Introduction 
The Mexican crisis of 1994-95 followed by the East Asian crisis of 1997-98 and the other crises in 
Brazil, Russia and Turkey in 1999-2000 have generated a great deal of academic and policy interest on the 
causes of currency crises in emerging and developing economies. The main focus of this literature has been 
on whether the crisis was “inevitable” (first generation models) or “self-fulfilling” (second generation 
models). A common element in both these two genre of crisis models is that, if a s peculative attack is 
successful in breaking down the currency peg, the resulting devaluation ought to mark the end of the crisis. 
Devaluation, according to the conventional view, would have expansionary effects because it increased the 
demand for tradeables (Dornbusch, 1988). In practice, the post-devaluation experiences have varied markedly 
among countries. Some countries like Brazil recovered smartly following the initial devaluation of the real. 
Others underwent a considerable output contraction immediately following floatation of the respective 
currencies. Kamin and Rogers (1997) and Santaella and Vela (1996) confirm this (contraction) to have been 
the case for Mexico following the 1994-95 crisis; Moreno (1999) shows it to have held for East Asia in 
general; and Rajan and Yang (2001) confirm it for the case of the trigger of the East Asian crisis, Thailand.  
In view of the above, Dooley and Walsh (2000) have commented, “(w)e are unsure why some crises 
are followed by long periods of economic recession while others are not” (p.3). This paper is an attempt at 
answering this query. In particular, we investigate two closely related questions. We first explore whether 
there is a difference in the output effects of a devaluation during “normal” periods versus crisis ones; after all, 
during noncrisis periods, real exchange devaluation is seen as an important policy option for promoting 
exports and output growth.
1 Yet, the literature has not made a distinction between crisis and noncrisis  
periods. To preview the main conclusion, we find that the contractionary effects tend to exist only during the 
crisis period. Building on this, we go one to explore the factors that cause a crisis-induced devaluation to be 
contractionary.  
The remainder of this paper is organized  as follows. Drawing upon recent analytical literature on 
currency crises and capital flows, the next section synthesizes the reasons for and channels via which a 
devaluation is contractionary. This section outlines the specific hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 and 4 
respectively describe the econometric model and the data to be used in the analysis. The main results are 
summarized in section 5. The final section offers a summary and a few concluding remarks. 
 
                                                 
1  For instance, Rodrik (2000) has noted “there is every reason to think that..(the)..real depreciations were an important 
boost to economic activity, particularly in tradables, and not simply something that went alongside higher growth. 
They unleashed energies and focused them on world markets, boosted exports, and set the stage for economic 
transformation” (pp.8-9).   3 
2.  Devaluation in Emerging and Developing Economies: Contractionary Channels 
2.1  New Structuralist School: Current Account Channels 
There exists a rich early literature that has detailed the various channels by which a devaluation might 
be contractionary in emerging and developing economies due to their unique economic structures, a point 
stressed by the so-called “New Structuralist” school (Taylor, 1981). There are various well established routes 
via which devaluation may, in principle, have a contractionary effect that spans both aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply (see Edwards, 1989, Lizondo and Montiel, 1989, and van Wijnbergen, 1986 for 
comprehensive reviews; Cooper, 1971 provides one of the earliest systematic surveys).  
On the demand side, and with both a high average propensity to import and a low price elasticity of 
demand for imports, devaluation will tend to divert domestic monetary demand away from home produced 
goods. The income redistributive effects of devaluation will favor profits in the traded goods sector—the 
mechanism through which devaluation affects the current account - and disfavor real wages, as the price level 
rises. However, spending and savings propensities may differ as between those receiving profits and wages. If 
the marginal propensity to save is higher from profits than from wages the economy’s average propensity to 
save will rise and this will tend to be demand contractionary (Diaz-Alejandro, 1963, Knight 1976). On the 
supply side, there are again a number of channels through which devaluation may exert a recessionary impact. 
To name one, the domestic currency costs of imported inputs will rise, leading to stagflationary effects.  
  Regardless of the exact channels, this New Structuralist School opines that devaluation is more likely 
the lower the income level of the country. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is as follows: The lower the per capita income 
level of a country the more likely that devaluation is contractionary. We refer to this as the “Income effect.”
2   
 
2.2  Regional Contagion Effects 
An important characteristic of emerging and developing economies is that a currency crisis tends to 
be accompanied by contagion or negative spillover effects that are largely regional in scope (consequently 
they are also referred to as “neighborhood effects”). For instance, while the East Asian crisis did threaten to 
turn global, it did not. Similarly, while the currencies of Thailand, Hong Kong and the Philippines underwent 
brief periods of speculative attacks during the Tequila crisis, the crisis predominantly affected Mexico’s 
neighboring economies (such as Argentina). In a recent study using a sample of 20 countries covering the 
periods of the 1982 Mexican debt crisis, the 1994-95 Tequila crisis and the 1997-98 Asian crisis, De Gregario 
and Valdes (2001) found contagion to be directly dependent on geographical horizon. Using a panel of annual 
data for 19 developing economies for the period 1977-93, Krueger et al (2000) concluded that a currency 
                                                 
2  Regression analysis of twelve developing economies for the period 1965-80 by Edwards (1986) suggested that real 
devaluations have a small contractionary effect in the short run but are neutral in the long run. However, in a broad 
survey of the empirical evidence, Kamin (1988) concluded that there was no empirical evidence to support the claim 
that devaluation per se was contractionary. He found that, more often that not, recessions preceded devaluation.   4 
crisis in a regional economy raises the probability of a speculative attack on the domestic currency by about 
8.5 percent points.
3 Thus, even if the New Structuralist arguments are rejected, it is possible that devaluation 
may fail to boost exports if it is accompanied by regional contagion effects. In other words, currency 
devaluation in one economy  may provoke a devaluation in one or more trade competitors (i.e. other 
economies with similar export structures/comparative advantage) that suddenly finds itself in a competitive 
disadvantage. 
Gerlach and Smets (1995) is a pioneering attempt at modeling the phenomenon of competitive 
devaluation. Their trade spillover model consists of two channels via which a trade partner is impacted. In the 
primary channel, devaluation in an export competitor leads to a deterioration in the trade balance in the 
partner country, causing a speculative attack on the latter. In the secondary channel, devaluation lowers the 
aggregate price level and demand. This leads to the domestic currency being substituted for foreign currency, 
depleting international reserves and making the economy vulnerable to a classic speculative attack. Two other 
recent models of competitive devaluation are by Huh and Kasa (1997) and Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini 
(2000) which is built on micro foundations. The Corsetti-Pesenti-Roubini model shows how a  game of 
competitive devaluation could generate currency overshooting if market participants, anticipating that a series 
of competitive devaluations will occur once there is a successful speculative attack in one country, flee 
altogether from the trade competitors.
4  
This leads to  Hypothesis 2 :  Devaluation may be contractionary in the presence of regional 
“contagion”. We dub this as the “Regional effect.” 
 
2.3  “Twin” Crisis 
    An important channel ignored by the older literature is the so-called “balance-sheet effect” due to 
sizeable unhedged exposures to short term foreign currency denominated debt (Aghion et al., 2000 and 
Krugman, 1999a,b).
5 The rise in corporate bankruptcies due to an escalation in domestic currency liabilities 
inevitably lead to large-scale domestic “credit rationing,” as decapitalized banks, burdened by large 
                                                 
3  Other recent empirical studies confirming this regional dimension of currency crises include Calvo and Reinhart 
(1996), Frankel and Schmukler (1996), Glick and Rose (1999) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000). 
4  The Corsetti-Pesenti-Roubini model also consists of a “bilateral trade” or “cheap imports” effect which is welfare-
enhancing, as it allows the importing country to enjoy a higher level of consumption, ceteris paribus, is also formally 
captured. As they show, if this effect dominates the welfare-reducing one due to loss of product competitiveness, 
devaluation in one country may not necessarily lead to a net welfare loss to its trading partner. In other words, 
devaluation may not necessarily be “beggar-thy-neighbor.”  
5  Over fifty percent of long term external debt in developing economies (for which data are available) is held in US 
dollars, with the remainder being held primarily in euros and Japanese yen. This inability by developing economies to 
borrow externally in their local currency has come to be referred to as the “original sin” hypothesis, a term attributed 
to Hausmann (1999). For a discussion of the implications of this original sin hypothesis on exchange rate policy in 
Southeast Asia, see Rajan (2001b) and references cited within.   5 
nonperforming loans (NPLs), curtail their lending.
6 It is therefore not surprising that currency crises in 
emerging and developing economies tend often to be accompanied by banking crises. The co-existence of 
banking and currency crises has been found to be the norm during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Kaminsky 
and Reinhart, 1999), and these twin crises seem to be far more pervasive in developing economies than 
developed ones (Glick and Hutchison, 1999).
7  
    This leads to Hypothesis 3: Other things equal, devaluation accompanied by a banking crisis is more 
likely to be contractionary. We refer to this as the “Banking Crisis effect.” 
 
2.4  Short Term Indebtedness 
  Krugman (1999b) has noted that the pro-competitive effects of a devaluation would dominate for 
“small” variations in the exchange rate, resulting in a devaluation being expansionary; while the balance 
sheets effects may dominate for “large” devaluations, resulting in an income contraction. The conundrum is 
that even a small devaluation in emerging and developing economies may act as a trigger leading to sharp 
capital outflows and an outright economic collapse after the initial devaluation. Thus, Krugman (1998) has 
noted, 
nobody who looks at the terrible experiences of Mexico in 1995 or Thailand in 1997 can 
remain a cheerful advocate of exchange rate flexibility. It seems that there is a double 
standard on these things: when a Western country lets its currency drop, the market in effect 
says “Good, that’s over” and money flows in. But when a Mexico or Thailand does the same, 
the market in effect says “Oh my God, they have no credibility” and launches a massive 
speculative attack. So the question for..(emerging and developing economies)..is, do you 
think that the market will treat you like Britain, or do you think it will treat you like Mexico? 
And this is not an experiment that any responsible policymaker wants to try.
8 
 
In other words, if devaluation damages confidence it may result in additional capital outflows. This in 
turn could cause a further decline in the currency’s value that was anticipated, leading to a vicious spiral of 
                                                 
6  We do not enter here into the controversial debate of defining what is meant by a “credit crunch” and how it is most 
appropriately measured, only recognizing that credit growth reflects both the demand for and supply of credit (see 
Lane and Associates, 1999, Lindgren et al., 1999 and Furman and Stiglitz, 1998).  
7  These “twin crises” have inspired a number of recent theoretical contributions to the literature on financial crises in 
emerging and developing economies The pioneering work in this area is Velasco (1987), who introduced a banking 
sector within a conventional Krugman (1979) framework. Also see Shen (1999). 
8  Calvo (1996) makes a similar point. It is actually interesting to recall the debate prior to the Mexican crisis 
documented in the Brookings Economic Papers in 1994. While Rudiger Dornbusch and Andrew Werner had proposed 
a devaluation of the peso of about 20 percent prior to the Mexican crisis, Guillermo Calvo (1994) was on record as 
opposing the peso devaluation, arguing that “(t)his is not the time to implement a Dornbusch-Werner devaluation. The 
forces that have held together the ‘good’ equilibrium…may dissipate overnight” (p.303).   6 
crisis-induced devaluation, illiquidity and insolvency of financial institutions and corporates, and eventual 
outright economic collapse.  
Received wisdom linking the composition of international capital flows to economic instability and 
financial crises is quite straightforward. Short term inflows (or “hot money”), it is argued, can be easily 
reversed. Thus, Fernández-Arias and Hausmann (2000a,b) refer to short term debt as “bad cholesterol” as it is 
motivated by “speculative considerations” such as interest rate differentials and exchange rate expectations
9. 
This type of financing is the first to exit in times of trouble, the resulting boom-bust cycle of capital flows in 
the 1990s having inflicted great damage to small and open economies. The extent of short term indebtedness 
has been found to be a robust predictor of financial crises (Dadush et al., 2000, Rodrik and Velasco, 1999 and 
World Bank, 2000). According to Dadush et al., on the basis of data for 33 developing economies, the 
elasticity of short term debt with GDP growth is 0.9 when there is a positive shock to output and -1.8 when 
there is a negative shock. This extreme reversibility of short term debt in the event of negative shock exposes 
borrowers to liquidity runs and systemic crises. 
This implies a further hypothesis to be tested. Hypothesis 4 :  The larger the level of short term 
indebtedness, ceteris paribus, the greater the likelihood that devaluation will be contractionary. We refer to 
this as the “Excessive Debt effect.”   
 
2.5  Composition of Capital Flows and Corruption 
The preceding emphasis on short term debt leaves the analysis open to two criticisms. One, short term 
debt is by no means the only form of liquid liability. An alternative—more complete—measure of illiquidity 
is given by “mobile capital” or international capital markets, which refers to short term bank loans plus 
portfolio investment in the form of equity and bond issues in offshore markets. Unfortunately, significant data 
problems exist in the case of components of international capital flows. These take the form of data 
unavailability, as well as concerns regarding possible substitutability between various types of capital flows 
(see Fernández-Arias and Hausmann, 2000a,b and Rajan and Siregar, 2001). Two, there is an active parallel 
area of research that has identified insolvency caused by poor public governance or “crony capitalism” as an 
important reason for crises in emerging and developing economies, especially in East Asia in 1997-98. Wei 
(2001) and Wei and Wu (2001) provide a way of resolving the illiquidity versus crony capitalism debate. 
Countries that are corrupt, and are therefore vulnerable to insolvency, tend also to have capital inflows that 
are biased away from more “secure” forms of financing (like FDI) towards the highly mobile variety, hence 
making them susceptible to illiquidity crises. 
                                                 
9  Prominent examples of illiquidity models include Chang and Velasco (1999) and Goldfajn and Valdes (1997), which 
are essentially open economy extensions of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) bank panic model.   7 
This leads us to Hypothesis 5:  The higher the level of corruption, ceteris paribus, the greater the 
likelihood that devaluation will be contractionary. We refer to this as the “Corruption effect.” 
 
2.6  State-Contingent Devaluation 
An important but oft-ignored analytical point is that the New Structuralist hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) 
opines that devaluations in emerging and developing economies will be contractionary regardless of whether 
it occurs during a period of “crisis” or a relatively tranquil (i.e. noncrisis) one. In c ontrast, the other 
hypotheses are more specifically relevant to the currency crisis periods. Therefore, before going on to test the 
five hypotheses set out above, we first investigate whether the output effects of devaluations in economies 
vary between crisis and non-crisis periods, i.e. “state contingent devaluation.” 
 
3.  Model Design and Sample Countries 
3.1    Econometric Model 
On the basis of the discussion in the previous section, we take a two-step approach in our econometric 
model. We first explore whether output does contract after a currency crisis. We then investigate the reasons 
for contraction based on the five hypothesis outlined in the previous section. The two step method is as 
follows: 
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where  it I  is the indicator function and 
 
                       it I = 1  if  there is no crisis   
 
                           = 0  if  there is a crisis    
 
is the output,  e  is the exchange rate,  X  is the vector of controlled variables, including government 
expenditure (g ), domestic interest rate (r ) and monetary policy (m). This is based on Agenor (1991) and   8 
Moreno (1999).
10 The tilde (
~) denotes the expected trend, i refers to the country and t is the time period. 
All  yit variables are adjusted using deviation from the expected trend. z  denotes our hypothesized variables, 
i.e. proxies for GNP per capita (income), regional effect (region),  banking crisis (bc), excessive short term 
debt hypothesis (debt), and poor public governance (proxied by corrupt), which represent the five hypotheses 
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where k = (1, 2) denotes the crisis regimes. 
The intuition guiding our econometric model is straightforward. The first step measures the responses 
of output to exchange rate movements in the “normal time” (noncrisis period) and the responses during the 
crisis period, respectively, separated by indicator I . That is, the output effects of exchange rate variations are 
different across the two regimes (i.e. crisis versus non-crisis).  
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In this  step, the exchange rate response of output is constant  within each regime but is different 
across regimes. We expect significant negative responses of output to exchange rate variations during the 
currency crisis, and no response or even  a positive response when there is no crisis. This specification 
differentiates our paper from past studies, which, as noted, do not distinguish the output responses during the 
normal time and chaotic period.  Failure to make this distinction could lead to misleading results and 
conclusions. 
The second step concerns the reasons causing the output collapse. We relate the response coefficient 
) (k
i a  to a constant 
) (
0















1 q q a + =   if there is a crisis, or a successful attack 
 
where  t z  is the proxy of above-mentioned five hypotheses alternatively, viz., 
                                                 
10 Hutchison (2001), in a study of IMF-supported stabilization programs, considers a somewhat different specification. 
The variables he includes in his specification are the inflation are, credit growth and real GDP growth, external growth 
rate and the real exchange rate overvaluation at t-1. 
11 We define these states of nature more precisely in the next section.   9 
t z = {income, region, bc, debt corrupt} 
   
The  Income  effect  hypothesis is proxied by GNP per capita.  Based on the New Structuralist 
arguments, we expect the coefficient to be positive, i.e. the lower the income level, the more likely it is that 
devaluation is contractionary. 
The Regional effect is proxied  by regional dummies  for Latin America, Asia, Nordics, Southern 
Europe and others (sample used is described in the next section). These regions correspond to the dummy 
variables 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively. 
The third  hypothesis pertains to the “twin crisis,” i.e. coincidence of currency and banking crises. 
This banking crisis hypothesis, proxied by a variable containing dates of banking crisis of each country. This 
dummy variable is denoted as bc, which is equal to one if there is a banking crisis, otherwise it is equal to 
zero.  
  The  Excessive debt hypothesis is proxied by the short term debt over total external debt. 
Unfortunately, such data are only available for developing countries in the World Bank's databank. As such, 
the Nordic countries are excluded when this hypothesis is tested. The coefficient is expected to be negative 
for reasons already outlined. 
  The Corruption hypothesis is proxied by a dummy variable ranging from 0 to 10. This dummy is 
taken from  LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer ( hereafter LLSV) ( 1998). This index is based on the 
International Country Risk’s assessment of government corruption  levels across countries. A l ower scores 
indicates that “high government officials are likely to demand special payments” and “illegal payments are 
generally expected throughout lower levels of government.” Thus, a higher score indicates less corruption and 
vice versa. 
 
4.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1  Sample Countries 
  We consider twenty five countries in this study. There are nine Latin American countries, including 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,  Columbus, Mexico, Peru,  Uruguay,  Venezuela; five Asian countries, 
including Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea and Thailand; four Nordic countries, including 
Denmark, Finland Norway and Sweden; three South European countries, including Czech Republic, Greece, 
Spain; and others including Egypt, Israel, South Africa and Turkey. These twenty five countries are selected 
based on the monograph by Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) which provides dates of currency and 
banking crises of the above twenty five sample countries.  
Goldstein et al. (2000) define the date of currency crisis as a situation in which an attack on the 
currency leads to a “substantial reserve loss” or to a “sharp depreciation of the currency.” Insofar as our five   10 
hypotheses ought, strictly speaking, to pertain only to a successful speculative, i.e. actual devaluation, we 
consider both the cases of a currency crisis as defined above as well as the case of only a “successful attack,” 
i.e. actual devaluation. We  date an attack as “ successful” if the percentage change of the  exchange rate 
exceeds 1.65 times one standard deviation of the percentage change of the exchange rate.  While many 
researchers also use 1.65 times one standard deviation of the percentage change of exchange rate as the 
criteria, such a technical rule is not without its flaws. Nonetheless, different criteria, such as using 1.96, do not 
alter the results significantly. The date of bank crisis is characterized by two types of events: bank runs that 
lead to the closure, merger, or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial institutions; and if there 
are no bank runs,  the closure, merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an important 
financial institution. Admittedly, t here may  be a  selection bias since floating exchange countries and 
developed countries are excluded.  As such, countries like the United Kingdom which  suffered  from a 
currency crisis during the September 1992, are not listed in Goldstein et al. (2000). 
The sample  initially spans the period  1981 to  1999; annual data is used. All data are taken from 
International Financial Statistics published by the International Monetary Fund and the World Development 
Indicator published by World Bank. Though the Czech Republic is included in the plot in Figure 1,  t is 
excluded from our econometric model since the data are only available from 1993.  
Following Moreno (1999) we consider two expected trends to remove nonstationary of variables. We 
first use the polynomial trended method. The expected trend method is obtained by regressing the variables 
on a constant, linear, quadratic, cube and quadruplet trends to obtain filtered variables. We then consider the 
Hodrick-Prescott trend method. The two filters yield broadly similar results. 
 
4.2  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the average growth rate of GDP and the five hypothetical proxies over the sample 
period for the countries under consideration. Since the numbers in Table 1 are averages over twenty five 
years, their information may be limited due to the wide variations over these years. The first column is the 
average growth rate across countries. Note that the Asian countries experienced a higher rate of growth than 
other countries in our sample despite the severe output contractions in 1997–98 by virtue of the phenomenal 
precrisis expansions. The next two columns are the currency and banking crises. The GDP per capita values 
are shown in the next column. The highest short term debt ratio is South Africa (43.68), followed by South 
Korea (30.73). Regional dummies are simply 1 to 5. The final column shows the corruption index. Figure 1 
plots the twenty five countries as well as their respective currency crises. It is worth noting that while the 
plots are based on the growth rate, the actual estimation is based on the deviation from expected trend. Figure 
2 is the output growth pre and post crisis. Note that the average output for these twenty five countries dropped   11 
when the crisis occurred. The average output continued to  contract in the cases of the Latin American and 
Asian countries, but not for the other three regions. 
 
5.  Estimation Results 
5.1  Contractionary Devaluation Hypothesis 
Figure 3 shows the scatter plot of filtered log exchange rate and filtered log outputs. While the filter is 
based on the polynomial  trended method, as noted, the results do not vary by much if the Hodrik-Prescott 
filter is used. Therefore, only the former filtered results are reported here. The plot is slightly negatively 
sloped with large variations, and is suggestive (but certainly not conclusive) of the contractionary devaluation 
hypothesis.  
We estimate equation 1  for each country (excluding  Czech Republic) and collect the estimated 
response coefficient of  1 a . Thus, we have twenty four response coefficients and histograms of them and their 
associated t values are plotted in Figure 4. Eighteen out of twenty four coefficients are negative and ten out of 
the eighteen negative coefficients are significant at the 10 percent level. Hence, while negative coefficients 
are typically observed, supporting the contractionary hypothesis, the trend is blurred by the large variations. 
Table 2 reports the estimation results of pooling twenty four countries. Three distinct models are 
estimated—a single regime or linear model (i.e. encompassing the entire sample period), and a pair of two-
regime models. The first two-regime model is based on the currency crisis index (i.e. both successful and 
unsuccessful speculative attacks) and the second two-regime model is based on only the cases of a successful 
attack. Regime 1 in both models is the normal period and regime 2 is the crisis period.  
With respect to the single regime model, while the response of output to exchange rate is negative, it 
is statistically insignificant. Hence,  using the single regime  model leads us to reject the contractionary 
devaluation hypothesis.  This is consistent with the negative trend and wide variations of sample  in the 
previous figures.  With respect the first two-regime model, using the currency crisis periods  to separate 
samples into the two regimes, the response coefficient turns out to be positive but is still insignificant in the 
normal regime. This is more consistent with the conventional wisdom that devaluation typically facilitates an 
output rebound. However, strongly negative  responses are discernible  in the crisis regime.    While the 
coefficient -0.0474 is close to that of a single-regime model, it is significant at the 1 percent level.  Hence, the 
contractionary devaluation does not exist during the normal time. It only does so during the crisis period. This 
validates our emphasis on state-contingent devaluation, a point that appears to have been largely ignored by 
the New Structuralist School. There is not much alteration in the results in the second two-regime model, 
where the crisis index is limited to the cases of a successful attack. The coefficient becomes slightly higher to 
-0.0521 and is also significant at the 1 percent level. Finally, the coefficient of determinant also increases   12 
slightly from 0.054 in the single-regime model to 0.069 in the first two-regime, and to 0.073 in the second 
two-regime model. 
 
5.2  Testing the Five Hypothesis  
Table 3 reports the estimation results assuming that response coefficient are functions of the five 
hypotheses alternatively. After plugging equation (2) into (1), the right hand of equation contains four 
interactive terms: 
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The coefficients of 
) 1 (
1 q  and 
) 2 (
1 q  represent the response of output to exchange rate variations with the 
presence ofz  during the normal and the crisis periods, respectively. Since the output does not drop during the 
normal period, our primary interest is the coefficient on the latter variable. In other words, for all the five 
hypotheses, the primary coefficient of interest is 
) 2 (
1 q . Our Iit  is first proxied by the currency crisis index 
which encompasses the cases when a crisis is unsuccessful in the sense that it does not lead to a devaluation.  
When z is the GNP per capita, the coefficient is 0.0121 and is insignificantly different from zero. The 
positive coefficient means that the lower the GNP per capita, the lower the output for a given devaluation. 
While the sign is consistent with the New Structuralist hypothesis, it is statistically insignificant and is 
rejected. 
When z proxies the regional dummies, the coefficient is significantly positive even at the 1 percent 
level. This confirms the regional effect. The significantly positive coefficient also implies that some regions 
seem to have an especially strong contractionary effect in comparison to other regions.  Because the regional 
dummy is equal to 1, 2,…, 5 when a country belongs to the Latin America, Asia, Nordics, Europe and others, 
the positive coefficient implies  that the Latin American and Asian countries experience deeper output 
contractions than the Nordics and South Europe countries when there is a crisis in each of the regions. Thus, 
our sample appears to support the regional effect.  
When  z  is the GNP per capita, the coefficient is  -0.1205. Though this coefficient is negative, 
suggesting that the banking crisis aggravates the declines of output, it is not significantly different from zero. 
Also, the response coefficient of ( e e ~ - ) ·  ) 1 ( = cc I  changes little compared to that presented in Table 2. 
Thus, the coincidence of a banking crisis and a currency crisis appears to be of little help in accounting for a 
devaluation-induced output collapse. 
When the ratio of short debt to total external debt ratio is used, the coefficient of interest is -0.0271, 
and significant at the only 10 percent level. Hence, when there is a currency crisis, the higher the short term   13 
debt, the greater the drop in output.
12  
Lastly, the corruption hypothesis is also confirmed. The primary coefficient of interest is significantly 
positive at the 1 percent level. Because the corrupt indicator ranges from 1 to 10, where a higher number 
indicates less corruption (better public governance), the positive response implies that the better the quality of 
public governance, the less likely that a currency crisis will be contractionary.  
When  it I is replaced by successful attack, part of the  results change.  In Table 4, GDP  per capita 
becomes significant at the 10% level, which confirms the New Structuralist Hypothesis. While the regional 
effect remains significant, it is only significant at the 10% level, in contrast to the 1% level when using the 
currency crisis index (which also includes the possibility of a unsuccessful speculative attack). Finally, results 
of the remaining three explanations do not change. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper has examined whether output declines when a fixed exchange rate regime is devalued. We 
find the output increases insignificantly during a “normal period” but drops during a “crisis period.” In other 
words, the impact of devaluation is state-contingent. This in itself is an important finding and has implications 
for an exit strategy between a pegged regime to a more flexible one. In particular, our analysis suggests that 
such a transition is best made during a period of relative calm (Eichengreen et al., 1999).
13  
Having linked a currency crisis and exchange rate devaluation with economic collapse, we proceeded 
to establish the circumstances whereby a crisis-induced devaluation may exert a recessionary influence. 
Drawing on recent literature on currency crisis, we outlined five hypotheses to explain the reasons for a crisis-
induced o utput contraction. The five hypotheses are the “Income effect,” based on the New Structuralist 
hypothesis; “Regional effect” to capture regional contagion effects; twin crisis, to denote the coincidence of a 
banking crisis and currency crisis; “Excessive D ebt effect” and “Corruption effect” which both capture 
aspects of composition of capital flows, i.e. short term capital flows are more easily reversible and potentially 
damaging to the real economy. The Corruption effect serves a dual purpose, also acting  as a proxy for 
particular attributes of insolvency.  
While all estimated coefficients have the anticipated signs, we reject outright the twin crisis 
hypothesis. Our results are broadly supportive of the other three hypotheses which emphasize the importance 
                                                 
12 We can only conjecture that this mild significance result may be a result of two possibilities. First, our data has not 
distinguished between short debt denominated in local currency versus foreign currency. The high short term debt may 
not necessarily lead to significant output losses if it is denominated in local currency since the devaluation does not 
automatically worsen the net worth of the economy (i.e. so-called “balance sheet effect”). Second, high short term debt 
and the currency crisis dummy may be highly correlated since the response coefficient of 
) 2 (
0 q  becomes insignificant. 
13 A related issue is, if a currency peg is abandoned, what alternative form of nominal anchor will need to replace it (Bird 
and Rajan, 2000 and Eichengreen et al., 1999)?          14 
of contagion and composition of capital flows. There is also weak evidence in support of the New 
Structuralist thesis. Taken as a whole, these findings may provide reason to pause before recommending 
devaluation to every country in crisis and to think carefully about what policies should accompany such an 
expenditure switching policy.  
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Table 1 

























Argentina  1.543  1981,1982, 1986, 1989, 1990 
 
1981,1986  7420.2  20.15  1  6.02 
Bolivia  1.912  1982,1983, 1985    7063.4  10.91  1  6.00 
Brazil  3.252  1983,1986, 1989, 1990,1998 
 
1986  7379.0  15.33  1  6.32 
Chile  5.080  1976,1982, 1984 
 
1982  6953.3  16.98  1  5.30 
Colombia  3.458  1982,1985 
 
1983,1985  7530.9  21.51  1  5.00 
Denmark  1.943  1979,1993 
 
  7728.0  NA  5  10.00 
Egypt  1.593  1979,1989, 1990 
 
  7072.1  16.19  4  5.00 
Finland  2.524  1982,1991, 1992 
 
1991,1992  6369.3  NA  3  10.00 
Greece  2.282  1976,1980, 1984 
 
  6537.5  NA  5  7.27 
Indonesia  5.170  1978,1983, 1986, 1997 
 
  6617.6  15.43  2  2.27 
Israel  3.874  1977,1983, 1984 
 
1983  6008.3  NA  4  8.33 
Malaysia  6.576  1975,1997 
 
1997  6451.0  17.03  2  7.38 
Mexico  3.271  1976,1982, 1994 
 
1982,1994  6536.1  16.95  1  4.77 
Norway  3.215  1978,1986, 1992 
 
1986  6293.6  NA  3  10 
Peru  1.731  1987 
 
  5489.5  21.09  1  4.7 
Philippines  2.928  1983,1984, 1997 
 
1983,1997  5530.6  25.00  2  2.92 
South Africa  5.039  1981,1984, 1996 
 
  6234.2  43.68  5  8.92 
Korea  6.956  1984,1997 
 
  6972.6  30.73  2  5.30 
Spain  2.430  1977,1982, 1986, 1992,1993 
 
1977  7332.9  NA  5  7.38 
Sweden  1.593  1981,1982, 1992 
 
1992  7649.1  NA  3  10.00 
Thailand  6.344  1978,1981, 1984, 1997 
 
1978,1992  7300.3  29.86  2  5.18 
Turkey  3.698  1980,1994 
 
1994  7583.9  21.57  4  5.18 
Uruguay  2.419  1982 
 
1982  8082.0  20.75  1  4.00 
Venezuela  1.840  1984,1986, 1989, 1994,1995  1994 
 
8263.8  23.35  1  4.7 
 
Dates of currency and banking crises are taken from Goldstein, et al. (2000); Corruption Index is taken from LLSV (1998)   20 
 
Table 2  












Two-Regime Model 2 
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2 R   0.054 
 
0.069  0.073 
 
*,**,*** denote the significance at 1, 5 and 10% level. 
Variables are deviated from expected trend, which uses polynomial trend method here.  
I = 1 denotes that there is no currency crisis or there is no successful attack 
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Table 3 
Testing the Five Hypotheses of Output Contraction During Currency Crisis 
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2 R     0.072  0.094  0.093  0.179  0.120 
Absolute t value in parenthesis;
*,
* * ,
* * * denote the significance at 1, 5 and 10% level 
All variables are deviated from expected trend, which uses polynomial trend method here.  
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Table 4 
Testing the Five Hypothesis of Output Contraction During Successful Attack 
 
 















0.0064  0.000  0.0077  0.0075  0.0075   
const. I ·  
) 1 (
0 a  
(0.838)  (0.010)  (1.061)  (1.031)  (1.054) 
-0.0717  -0.0719*  -0.0303**  0.0415  -0.2302*  I e e · - ) ~ (   ) 1 (
0 q  
(0.589)  (3.366)  (2.166)  (0.792)  (3.788) 
0.0058  0.0334*  -0.1418  -0.0311  0.0367*  I z e e · · - ) ~ (   ) 1 (
1 q  
(0.348)  (2.556)  (1.361)  (1.623)  (3.404) 
-0.0011  -0.0009  -0.001  -0.0028  -0.0014  const. ) 1 ( I - ·   ) 2 (
0 a  
(0.433)  (0.375)  (0.415)  (1.070)  (0.581) 
-0.2038*  -0.0708*  -0.0553*  0.0221  -0.1604*  ) 1 ( ) ~ ( I e e - · -   ) 2 (
0 q  
(2.239)  (4.773)  (5.166)  (0.440)  (4.845) 
0.0188***  0.0126***  0.0648  -0.0306***  0.0194*  ) 1 ( ) ~ ( I z e e - · · -
 
) 2 (
1 q  
(1.685)  (1.813)  (1.318)  (1.720)  (3.454) 
0.0085  0.0117  0.0091  0.0074  0.0085  g g ~ -    
(1.029)  (1.422)  (1.105)  (1.018)  (1.063) 
0.0248*  0.0249*  0.0282*  0.036*  0.0225*  m m ~ -    
(2.504)  (2.562)  (2 .805)  (3.909)  (2.347) 
-0.0125  -0.0126  -0.0136  -0.0034  -0.0118  r r ~ -    
(1.463)  (1.535)  (1.613)  (0.446)  (1.466) 
2 R     0.078  0.092  0.093  0.178  0.120 
             Absolute t value in parenthesis;
*,
* * ,
* * * denote the significance at 1, 5 and 10% level 
             All variables are deviated from expected trend, which uses polynomial trend method here.  
             I = 1 if there is no successful attack; I= 0 if  there is a successful crisis. 
 
 